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The Blame Game: How the Rhetoric of Choice Blames
the Achievement Gap on Women
Nicole Buonocore Porter*
ABSTRACT
In 2013, fifty years after the Equal Pay Act guaranteed women
equal pay for equal work, almost fifty years since Title VII made discrimination based on sex unlawful, thirty-five years since the Pregnancy Discrimination Act made it unlawful to discriminate against women
because of pregnancy, and nineteen years after the Family and Medical Leave Act provided twelve weeks of unpaid leave for some caregiving reasons, there is still a significant achievement gap between
men and women in the workplace. Women still make less money, and
rise more slowly and not as high in workplace hierarchies. Why? The
common narrative states that because these laws have given women
access to formal equality for many years, the fact that women have not
achieved equality in the workplace must be blamed on something else.
Specifically, the “something else” relied upon by society, the media,
employers, and courts, is that women’s own choices are to blame for
the achievement gap. The blame game asserts that women’s relative
lack of success in the workplace is caused by three interrelated choices: (1) women’s decision to not pursue high-pressure, high-status professions, or jobs that are seen as “men’s work”; (2) women’s unwillingness to negotiate on their own behalf; and (3) women’s decision to
devote more time and effort to caregiving and homemaking tasks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite presidential-hopeful Mitt Romney’s reference to “bind1
ers full of women” available to work in high-level government jobs,

*
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thank Professor Kerri Stone and the editors of the FIU Law Review for inviting me to this symposium. I would also like to thank the faculty at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law
for their helpful comments when this article was presented as an early work in progress.
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there is ample evidence that there is still a significant achievement gap
between men and women in the workplace. “Women as a group earn
less than men, progress more slowly through the ranks of most busi2
3
nesses, and rarely rise as high.” Whether we call it a glass ceiling, a
4
maternal wall, or some other metaphor for women’s comparative lack
of success in the workplace, the reality is that women simply do not
progress as high up the corporate ladder as men, nor do they progress
5
as quickly as men in the workplace. And in almost all industries and
6
occupations, women make less than men working in similar jobs.
Because there are several laws designed to end discrimination
7
against women the oldest of which, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, is fifty
most people assume that these laws have successfully
years old

1
As many will undoubtedly recall from the 2012 presidential campaign, during the third
presidential debate, Romney stated that when he was Governor of Massachusetts, he was unhappy with the number of women in high-ranking government positions, and he allegedly requested to have more female candidates to consider. During the debate, he said that his aides
brought him “binders full of women,” a phrase that caused criticism by some, and laughter by
almost everyone else.
2
LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE
GENDER DIVIDE 104 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003).
3
There are many different definitions of glass ceiling. Professor Christine Jolls has defined it as follows: if barriers exist in the workplace that “block the advancement of qualified
women, then a glass ceiling is present.” Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling? 25 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (citations omitted). Another definition of glass ceiling “refers to situations where the advancement of a qualified person within the hierarchy of an organization is
stopped at a lower level because of some form of discrimination based on a protected characteristic,” such as sex. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling,
63 SMU L. REV. 17, 19 (2010); see also M. Neil Browne & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Many Paths
to Justice: The Glass Ceiling, the Looking Glass, and Strategies for Getting to the Other Side, 21
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 61, 63-64 (2003) (defining the glass ceiling as a “metaphor that describes hidden barriers that prevent individuals from advancing upward in their organizations
into high-level managerial positions”); Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling & Sexual Stereotyping:
Historical and Legal Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 581, 581
(1997) (defining the glass ceiling as the “transparent promotion barrier that prevents qualified
women from reaching the highest levels in their professions”).
4
Professor Joan Williams coined this term. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 69-70 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
5
See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 3, at 15.
6
Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 25.
7
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits all
types of employment discrimination based on sex as well as race, color, religion, and national
origin, is almost fifty years old. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006), which amended Title VII to define the term
“because of sex” to include “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.” Id. Even the youngest of the statutes protecting women’s employment rights, the Family
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994), et seq., was passed in 1994 and is almost twenty
years old.
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broken down barriers for women in the workplace, and therefore
8
something else must be to blame for women’s lack of achievement.
9
This article explores the “blame game,” the prevalent belief that
women’s own choices are responsible for the achievement gap between men and women in the workplace. This common narrative
blames the achievement gap on three distinct but related “choices”
women allegedly make.
First, the blame narrative asserts that women deliberately do not
choose high-pressure, high-status occupations or jobs that are seen as
“men’s work.” Second, regardless of occupation, women’s pay is less
than men’s pay in similar jobs allegedly because many women choose
not to negotiate their starting salary or raises. Third, the narrative
maintains that women’s decisions to devote more time to caregiving
and homemaking influence their career choice, in that they are less
likely to take positions that require excessive hours, inflexible sched10
ules, or frequent travel, and influence their performance on the job,
which can in turn influence their pay and contribute to the pay gap.
In other words, instead of looking at possible discriminatory reasons for the achievement gap between men and women, society, the
11
media, employers, and courts blame women themselves. To be clear,
plenty of scholars have discussed this “rhetoric of choice” and demon-

8
See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 26, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/magazine/26WOMEN.html?pagewanted=all (stating that the
barriers for women in the workplace are down, there is parity in education, women are getting
high-status professional jobs, but then, “suddenly, they stop” as only 16% of partners in law firms
are women, only 16% of corporate officers are women, and only eight fortune 500 companies are
run by women); Judith S. Kaye, Moving Mountains: A Comment on the Glass Ceiling and Open
Doors Report, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 573, 574 (1996) (stating that despite the fact that barriers for
lawyers are down, women attorneys are still encountering many of the same obstacles as decades
ago).
9
See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND
CLASS MATTER 2 (Harvard Univ. Press 2010) (“Conservatives argue that what keeps women
back today is not workplace discrimination but the choices they make in family life. Liberal
feminists join in, exhorting women to ‘man up’ and insist on equality within the household.”); see
also Browne & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 3, at 68 (stating that some writers assume that
choices women make account for almost the entire glass ceiling phenomenon, but also noting
that others assume that employers’ discriminatory practices constitute most of the problem).
10 But see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1820 (1990) (indicating that studies show that contrary to conventional
wisdom, sex segregation does not persist because women’s commitment to the family leads them
to choose lower-paid, female-dominated occupations).
11 Some scholars argue that too much emphasis is placed on workplace discrimination as
an excuse for the glass ceiling rather than looking at the decisions women have made. Kingsley
R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and
the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971, 977 (1995). Id. at 978-79 (arguing that it is seldom considered that the gender pay gap may be a reflection of real differences between men and women).
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12

not always critically
that society tends to blame women
strated
13
for their own lack of success in the workplace. However, most of that
scholarship focuses on one of the three choices that women make. For
14
instance, Vicki Schultz and others have discussed how women’s alleged “choice” of occupation has led to both gender segregation as
well as women’s relative lack of success in the workplace. Linda Bab15
cock and Sara Laschever, in their popular book Women Don’t Ask,
discuss how women’s “choices” to not negotiate has contributed sig16
nificantly to the pay gap. Joan Williams has also discussed the common narrative that women’s success in the workplace is negatively
affected by their “choices” related to caregiving, either the choice to
opt-out of the workforce completely or to “choose” to put family first
17
and career second. Where this article differs is that it is the first attempt to bring all three “choices” together, and to demonstrate that
these three choices work in tandem to encompass all of the ways in
which women’s achievement in the workplace falls short of men’s.
One huge disclaimer is in order. I believe that the majority of
these “choices” are not freely-made, autonomous decisions. Rather,
all three of these choices are, to a greater or lesser extent, constrained
— women are constrained in their decisions by gender norms within
their families, by society’s expectations, and most importantly, by
workplace attitudes and structures that operate to discriminate
against women, forcing them into decisions that contribute to the
achievement gap between men and women. Therefore, I believe that
it is unjust to blame the achievement gap on women’s choices when
18
these decisions are not truly autonomous. Because I could not make
this normative argument in the relatively short space of this symposium article, I will leave the discussion of the “autonomy myth” for an12

Id. at 971.
See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 153; Belkin, supra note 8; BABCOCK & LASCHEVER,
supra note 2, at 114; Schultz, supra note 10, at 1754.
14 See generally Schultz, supra note 10.
15 BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 2.
16 Id. at 8.
17 WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 10; see also Belkin, supra note 8; Nicole Buonocore Porter,
Why Care About Caregivers? Using Communitarian Theory to Justify Protection of “Real” Workers, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 355, 384 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, Why Care?]; Browne & GiampetroMeyer, supra note 3, at 71 (stating that scholars agree that choices women make about how to
spend their time affect their ability to rise to a high-level position); Catherine J. Weinberger, In
Search of the Glass Ceiling: Gender & Earnings Growth Among U.S. College Graduates in the
1990s, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 949, 949 (2011) (stating that “it is a well-known fact that the
gender gap in earnings tends to be larger among older workers is sometimes attributed to gender
differences in the rate of accumulation of human capital due to family responsibilities”).
18 I have made a similar argument regarding caregiving and regarding negotiating for pay.
Porter, Why Care?, supra note 17, at 389; Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 195 (2011).
13
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other day and another paper. Thus, this article is, by necessity, purely a
descriptive one, demonstrating to the reader that the common narrative blames women’s relative lack of workplace success on the choices
women are alleged to have made and are often believed to have freely
made.
Part II of this article will demonstrate how the rhetoric of choice
is used to blame women for their relative lack of achievement in the
workplace. It will proceed in three sub-parts. First, courts and employers have argued that much of what seems like discrimination
against women, causing either job segregation or the glass ceiling, is
actually caused by women choosing to avoid certain careers; either
because they want to avoid high-pressure, high-status jobs, or because
they want to avoid jobs that are traditionally seen as “men’s work.”
The second sub-part will address the pay gap, discussing the case law
and literature where employers, courts, and scholars argue that part of
the reason the pay gap exists is because women choose not to negotiate their salaries and raises. The third and final sub-part will discuss
the most frequent use of the rhetoric of choice — the argument that
women do not progress as far in the workplace, or make as much
money, because of the choices they make to spend more time than
men on caregiving and homemaking tasks. Part III will then turn to
how these three choices converge, using a story to demonstrate how
the intersection of these three choices affect the achievement gap between men and women. Finally, Part IV will conclude.
19

II. THE RHETORIC OF CHOICE

As stated by psychologist Virginia Valian in her book, “Why So
Slow,” “men dominate virtually every prestigious or high-paying pro20
fession in the United States.” “It is undeniably true that women do
not attain the very highest levels in business hierarchies at a level
21
commensurate with their representation in the general labor force[.]”
The achievement gap between men and women is also evidenced by
the fact that women still suffer a wage penalty that is not explained by
“market characteristics, working conditions, individual characteristics,

19 Some of this discussion is derived from my prior work. See Porter, Why Care?, supra
note 17, at 375 (discussing the rhetoric of choice regarding caregiving responsibilities).
20 VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 14 (1999).
21 Browne, supra note 11, at 1064; Weinberger, supra note 17, at 967 (stating that the glass
ceiling metaphor sometimes refers to gender differentials at the top of the hierarchy). Of course,
there are some who believe that what causes the biggest obstacle for women is not just being a
woman, but rather, being a mother. Joan C. Williams, Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Justice Ginsburg and Reconstructive Feminism, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1267, 1296 (2012) [hereinafter Williams, Ginsburg].
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children, housework time, and observed productivity.” Although the
23
amount of the gap varies, virtually every study reveals some pay gap.
As stated above, because most people agree that overt forms of
if not been virtually
discrimination have decreased significantly
eliminated
since the passage of Title VII and other laws protecting
women, most people believe something else is to blame for women’s
24
lack of success in the workplace. In this Part, I demonstrate that
women’s relative lack of success in the workplace is blamed on their
own choices.
The rhetoric of choice is a powerful one in our society. Liberal
theory emphasizes that we are all autonomous individuals, engaging in
25
freely-made decision-making. Similarly, Law and Economics’ “rational choice theory” argues that all humans are motivated by selfinterest and therefore, if a person engages in an action, it must be in
26
his or her self-interest. Thus, employers, courts, scholars, and the media find it fairly simple to blame women’s fate in the workplace on the
choices women have made. Whether the choices are regarding occupation, whether to negotiate, or how to divide time and energy between work and family, the story told is that women make choices that
27
in turn affect their success in the workplace. This Part will discuss
those choices.

22 Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and Responsibility, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 573, 582 (2006).
23 And even a small but consistent pay gap (e.g., five percent) is problematic. VALIAN,
supra note 20, at 189-90 (“Only 100 percent parity is equality and only equality is good enough.
The demands of justice are clear. No difference based on sex is acceptable.”).
24 MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 14 (Wolters
Kluwer, 3d ed. 2013) (“The old notion that women are not intelligent enough or lack the moral
accountability to be leaders in business, politics, or the academy has been replaced by justifications entered on women’s choice.”).
25 Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Polices and Liberal Theory, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 150-51 (1998).
26 Laura Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural
Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 441
(2001).
27 Joan C. Williams, Tough Guise, in 9 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP Iss. 2 Art. 11, Legal
Feminism Now 1 (2011) [hereinafter Williams, Tough Guise] (stating that: (1) in the business
community, people still assert that women lead differently than men and are more focused on
relationships, and (2) newspapers perpetually announced a new trend of women opting out when
they find out they have different values than men).
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28

A. The “Choice” of Occupation
29

Despite much progress, occupational segregation in this country
30
is still at very high (almost staggering) levels. As stated by Professor
Vicki Schultz: “Social science research has documented, and casual
observation confirmed, that men work mostly with men, doing ‘men’s
31
work,’ and women work mostly with women, doing women’s work.”
Additionally, it is well known that occupational segregation has consequences for women workers because work done by women tradi32
tionally pays less and has less status. This is true despite the fact that
sex segregation is arguably the primary evil that Title VII aimed at
33
correcting.
This occupational segregation could be blamed on one of two
things: (1) either women are not interested in men’s work, whether
those jobs are blue collar “men’s work” or high-status, professional
jobs that require substantial amounts of ambition and hard work; or
(2) employers are not hiring women, or are putting up barriers for
34
women’s entry into those positions. The blame narrative asserts that
35
women are choosing “women’s work” instead of “men’s work.”
When these cases are litigated, this is called the “lack of interest” de-

28 To be clear, some argue that it is not just the “choice” of occupation that causes the glass
ceiling — it is also women’s behavior once on the job. In other words, even when women are
working in male-dominated occupations, some argue that they are less competitive and less
“single-minded about acquiring resources,” and that these things contribute to their relative lack
of success. Browne, supra note 11, at 980.
29 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 23 (stating that in 2007, women were 51% of all employees in
management, professional, and related occupations and they were 33% of all lawyers and 43%
of all judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers).
30 See generally Schultz, supra note 10, at 1750; Bridge, supra note 3, at 593 (stating that
occupational segregation has existed throughout the history of the United States). But see Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 22-23 (stating that, although occupational segregation still exists and
women are underrepresented in managerial positions, many professions have become more
integrated).
31 Schultz, supra note 10, at 1751.
32 Id.; see also Bridge, supra note 3, at 593 (stating that women are still heavily concentrated in lower paying and less prestigious occupations traditionally dominated by women); see also
id. at 597 (stating that women are still heavily concentrated in occupations in which women have
been overwhelmingly employed since the 1950s).
33 Schultz, supra note 10, at 1778. There is also evidence that Congress intended sex discrimination to be taken as seriously as the other protected classes. Id. at 1778, n.151.
34 Browne & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 3, at 73 (giving an example of either women
choosing or employers forcing them into occupations that require the ability to help others get
along).
35 Of course, some might back date the decision-making even more and argue that women
are not only choosing women’s work but that they are also less likely to “choose the most remunerative technical college majors.” Weinberger, supra note 17, at 950.
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fense, and if the court accepts the defense, it is a complete defense to
36
liability.
37
The most famous of the “lack of interest” cases is EEOC v. Sears
38
Roebuck & Co. In this case, the EEOC sued Sears, alleging that
Sears has discriminated against women by not hiring them into the
higher-paying commission sales jobs (selling appliances, draperies, and
other home improvement products and services) and instead only
employed them in the sales jobs that did not pay commission (such as
39
clothes, shoes, etc.). The EEOC used statistics to prove their claim,
and their statistical data showed that Sears had significantly underhired women sales applicants for the more lucrative commission sales
positions, even after controlling for potential sex differences in quali40
fications. The judge refused to credit the statistics, stating that they
were “virtually meaningless” because they failed to account for the
fact that women were not as interested in the higher-paying commis41
sion sales jobs and preferred the lower-paying, non-commission jobs.
In other words, women were underrepresented in the higher-paying
jobs because they “chose” to not apply for them. According to the
judge, women chose the lower-status and lower-paying positions because their feminine traits, such as being friendly, cooperative, and
nurturing, conflicted with the requirements of the higher-paying sales
42
jobs, which required employees to be aggressive and assertive.
In her article, Vicki Schultz studied all of the published decisions
43
since 1965 addressing the lack of interest defense. The results are
illuminating and confirm that there is a strong focus on the concept of
choice. Interestingly, Schultz first noted that this defense does not
succeed in the race context. In fact, in two Supreme Court race dis44
45
crimination cases, Teamsters and Hazelwood, the employers defended the systemic race discrimination claims by arguing that racial minorities were not as interested in the better paying “line driver” positions in Teamsters or the school teacher positions in the Hazelwood
36

Schultz, supra note 10, at 1780.
Id. at 1753 (stating that fewer cases had received as much attention or provoked as much
controversy as the Sears case).
38 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
39 Schultz, supra note 10, at 1752. For instance, women constituted 61% of all full-time
sales applicants but only 27% of the commission sales workers. In contrast, women made up
approximately 75% of the non-commission sales force. Id. at n.6.
40 Id. at 1752.
41 Id.
42 Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1302; see also Schultz, supra note 10, at 1804 (discussing details of
the Sears case).
43 Schultz, supra note 10, at 1754.
44 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977).
45 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 312 (1977).
37
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case. In both cases, the Supreme Court rejected a per se lack-ofinterest defense and required the employer to prove that minorities
46
were not interested in those positions.
In Teamsters, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that
minority employees did not apply for those jobs because they were
not interested. Instead, the Court stated that most minority employees would have been deterred from applying for these positions because the employer’s discriminatory practices were well known and
the minority employees would have therefore assumed that applying
47
for those positions was a futile gesture. Similarly, in Hazelwood, under a slightly different analysis, the Court also rejected the lack of interest defense in the race context.
Similar to the Supreme Court cases, lower court cases also reveal
a difference between how race is addressed versus how sex is addressed. In race segregation cases, there is a presumption that racial
48
segregation is attributed to historical labor market discrimination.
The courts seem to recognize in race cases that preferences are shaped
by jobs historically open to black workers, as well as their experiences
49
in the workplace. But in sex cases, courts use different frameworks
than for race discrimination cases, and the result is that defendant
employers win on the “lack of interest” argument in sex cases over
50
40% of the time. In other words, almost half of all courts blame
51
women for sex segregation.
One prominent difference between race and sex cases is how the
courts handle evidence of past employer discrimination. Courts note
that the evidence of past discrimination (especially if it is well-known)
indicates that minority employees would not apply for those jobs because they would know that doing so would be futile. This “futility”
52
argument is often successful in race discrimination cases. However,
in sex discrimination cases, evidence of past discrimination is not per53
suasive because courts believe that past discrimination was also
based on women’s choices. Even more liberal courts are skeptical that
past generations of women would have wanted to work in non-

46

Schultz, supra note 10, at 1759.
Id. at 1760.
48 Id. at 1770.
49 Id.; see also id. at 1771-75 (discussing the systemic race discrimination cases where the
employer argued that minorities were not interested in the higher pay, higher status jobs).
50 Id. at 1776.
51 Id. at 1777.
52 Id. at 1781.
53 Id. at 1782. However, interestingly, courts are more likely to give weight to evidence of
past discrimination if that evidence is anecdotal rather than statistical. Id. at 1783.
47
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traditional jobs even if employers allowed them to. In these cases,
courts do not consider that the past segregation could have been
caused by women being deterred from applying for non-traditional
55
jobs because they would recognize that it was futile to do so.
Courts also have a tendency to insist on anecdotal evidence in sex
discrimination cases, despite the fact that evidence of a few employees
being discriminated against does not get the court any closer to decid56
ing the reason for the widespread statistical differences. Nevertheless,
courts look for anecdotal evidence because it proves that the “modern” woman exists and that some women have aspirations for nontra57
ditional work. In fact, the lack of anecdotal evidence seemed to be
the main factor that led to the employer succeeding on the lack of
interest defense in the Sears case. The judge stated: “It is almost inconceivable, that, in a nationwide suit alleging a pattern and practice
of intentional discrimination for at least eight years involving more
than 900 stores, EEOC would be unable to produce even one witness
58
who could credibly testify that Sears discriminated against her.”
Thus, according to the judge, the EEOC’s failure to produce individual
victims confirmed that Sears’ segregation was attributable to women’s
59
own choices.
The way that employers and conservative courts use the lack of
interest defense is to emphasize the masculinity of the work in blue60
collar jobs and the femininity of women in white-collar jobs. For instance, for blue-collar jobs, courts adopt the lack of interest defense by
invoking images of work that is heavy, dirty, demanding, and unap61
pealing. Once the court describes the work in such masculine terms,
62
women’s lack of interest is assumed as a matter of “common sense.”
By contrast, in white-collar jobs, courts begin by describing not
the job, but women, as feminine. For instance, in the Sears case, the
court stated:
Women tend to be more interested than men in the social and
cooperative aspects of the workplace. Women tend to see them54

Id. at 1785.
Id. at 1786.
56 Id. at 1798 (“Because there is no way of verifying whether the plaintiffs’ or the employer’s witnesses are representative of the larger pool of eligible women, anecdotal evidence gets
the court no closer to determining what proportion of the women in the pool were interested in
the work.”).
57 Id. at 1795.
58 Id. at 1796 (quoting Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1324-25).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1801.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1802.
55

2013]

How the Rhetoric of Choice Blames the Achievement Gap

457

selves as less competitive. They often view non-commission sales
as more attractive than commission sales, because they can enter
and leave the job more easily, and because there is more social
63
contact and friendship, and less stress in non-commission selling.
The women were “romanticized as friendly and noncompetitive” and
the commission sales jobs required the opposite. The manual described a commission salesperson as a “special breed of cat” who has a
64
“sharper intellect” and “more powerful personality.” Sears also administered a sales applicant test that included questions such as: “Do
you have a low-pitched voice?;” “Do you swear often?;” “Have you
65
ever done any hunting?;” and “Have you played on a football team?”
As Schultz stated, the “story portrays gender as so complete and natural as to render invisible the processes through which gender is social66
ly constructed by employers.” Thus, it leaves courts free to blame
segregation on women’s decisions to enter certain jobs.
Liberal courts try to suppress gender difference by looking at the
few women who defy gender norms and stereotypes. According to
liberal courts, Title VII was supposed to rid employers and society of
stereotypical decisions so these courts emphasize the fact that not all
67
women fit the gender stereotype of desiring traditionally female jobs.
This approach asserts that even though women as a group might be
less interested in non-traditional work, some individual women might
be interested in such work and, therefore, an employer is forbidden
from presuming that all women will not aspire to do non-traditional
68
work. This approach assumes, like the conservative approach, that
69
women form job preferences through pre-work socialization. The
only disagreement between the two approaches is the number of
70
women who have been socialized to prefer non-traditional work.
Like courts, the media also assumes that women deliberately
choose low-pressure, low-status jobs. Possibly the most famous (or
infamous) example is Lisa Belkin’s New York Times article in 2003,
71
titled “The Opt-Out Revolution,” where the author asks the ques63

Id. at 1803.
Id. at 1804 (citing Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1290).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1805.
67 Id. at 1806.
68 Id. Of course, this approach is not necessarily logical because the employer is not asserting that no individual woman is interested in nontraditional work, but rather, that women as a
group are sufficiently less interested than men to explain their statistical underrepresentation.
Id. at 1807.
69 Id. at 1808.
70 Id.
71 Belkin, supra note 8.
64
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tion: “Why don’t women run the world?” and answers it: “Maybe it’s
72
because they don’t want to.” While Belkin is mostly talking about
the choice to opt-out of the workplace because of motherhood (which
will be discussed further below), some of her article can be (and was)
read more broadly as an argument that women do not care about the
73
money and prestige that come with success in the workplace. Even
74
though this story was nothing new, the media latched on to it, telling
75
the tale that women are “getting real about their limitations.”
B.

The “Choice” to Not Negotiate

When women try to remedy the pay gap by suing for pay discrimination, some employers defend these cases by arguing that the reason
the female employee was paid less than the male employee is because
76
he negotiated for his salary and she did not. Obviously, other factors
contribute to the pay gap between men and women including, as dis77
cussed above, occupational segregation, and as discussed below,
women’s decisions regarding work/life balance. But here, I am only
referring to situations where men and women are performing “equal
78
work,” but men are paid more because they “choose” to negotiate
79
and women do not. Some courts have allowed employers to defend a
pay differential under the catch-all Equal Pay Act affirmative defense
“any other factor other than sex,” by pointing to the fact that the man
80
negotiated and the woman did not.
81
For instance, in Horner v. Mary Institute, the plaintiff was being
82
paid $7,500 annually as a physical education instructor. Shortly after
hiring the plaintiff, the defendant offered a male physical education
72

Id.
Id. (stating that women are deciding that they don’t want to do what it takes to get to
the top). “Women are redefining success. They are redefining work.” Id.
74 Joan Williams, The Opt-Out Revolution Revisited, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Feb. 19,
2007), http://prospect.org/article/opt-out-revolution-revisited (stating that the New York Times
has been using the choice rhetoric since 1953).
75 Id.
76 See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 18, at 178.
77 At least one scholar has argued that women’s choices of college major also explain a
substantial portion of the gender gap in earnings among college graduates. See Weinberger,
supra note 17, at 950-51.
78 “Equal work” is the standard under the Equal Pay Act—a plaintiff bringing an EPA suit
must prove that she was being paid less than a male who was performing “equal work on jobs
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions.” See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
79 For a discussion of employers relying on the willingness to negotiate and other “market
excuses,” see Porter & Vartanian, supra note 18, at 178-79.
80 Id.
81 613 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1980).
82 Id. at 709.
73
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instructor the same salary, but the male instructor was unwilling to
accept less than $9,000, so the employer paid him the higher salary
83
and kept the plaintiff’s salary at the lower amount. The court accepted salary negotiation as a legitimate affirmative defense under the
84
catch-all affirmative defense. The court stated that the employer
“may consider the market place value of the skill of a particular indi85
vidual when determining his or her salary.” Other courts have fol86
lowed suit.
In a book that became very popular with the press, “Women
87
Don’t Ask,” authors Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever argue that
much of the pay gap can be attributed to women not negotiating on
88
their own behalf:
Women don’t ask. They don’t ask for raises and promotions and
better job opportunities. They don’t ask for recognition for the
good work they do. They don’t ask for help at home. In other
words, women are much less likely than men to use negotiation
89
to get what they want.
In one study, twenty percent of women surveyed said they never nego90
tiate anything. And it is rare that an employer will pay a woman
91
more if she does not ask for more.
This decision to not negotiate has significant financial consequences. Even a one-time decision to not negotiate a starting salary

83

Id. at 710.
Id. at 714.
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., Reznick v. Assoc. Orthopedics & Sports Med., P.A., 104 F. App’x 387, 391-92
(5th Cir. 2004) (finding no EPA violation where a male surgeon negotiated higher compensation
level in his initial employment contract than the plaintiff); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d
1446, 1462 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no EPA violation where a male comparator negotiated a
higher salary); EEOC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 4:07CV0143, 2009 WL 395835, at *10
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2009) (finding a valid factor other than sex where male employees were able
to negotiate higher starting salaries than the plaintiff); see also Porter & Vartanian, supra note 18,
at 179. But see Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 596 (11th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the
employer’s defense that wage disparities resulted from negotiations surrounding the purchases
of comparators’ businesses); Day v. Bethlehem Ctr. Sch. Dist., No. 07-159, 2008 WL 2036903, at
*9 (W.D. Pa. May 9, 2008) (rejecting the school district’s defense at the summary judgment stage
that male comparators negotiated salaries that were higher than the standard salary scale); Klaus
v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 706, 723-24 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (denying summary
judgment where the employer defended a $36,000 wage disparity based on the male comparator’s negotiation of higher salary).
87 See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 2.
88 Id. at 5-6, 11.
89 Id. at 8.
90 Id. at 25.
91 Id. at 21.
84
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92

can lead to an enormous pay disparity. As stated by Babcock and
93
Laschever, molehills really do become mountains. One study estimates that a woman who negotiates her starting salary and her salary
increases will earn over one million dollars more by the time she re94
tires than a woman who just accepts what she is offered. The net result of women not asking is a “huge imbalance in the distribution of
resources and opportunities between men and women. Because
women ask for what they want less often than men do, and therefore
get what they want much less of the time, the inequities in our society,
95
and all the problems they create, continue to pile up.”
C.

The Caregiving Choice

Perhaps the “choice” most often blamed for women’s relative
lack of success in the workplace is the choice women make in balanc96
ing work and family. As stated by Joan Williams: “Conservatives argue that what keeps women back today is not workplace discrimination but the choices they make in family life. Liberal feminists join in,
exhorting women to ‘man up’ and insist on equality within the house97
hold.” It is undoubtedly true that even today, women, on average,
spend far more time on caregiving and homemaking tasks than men,
98
even when they work full time. This choice contributes to both as-

92 Id. at 20. The authors point to the example of an equally qualified man and woman who
both receive job offers for $25,000 per year. The man negotiates and gets his offer raised to
$30,000, but the woman does not negotiate. Even assuming identical three percent raises every
year (which is unlikely), by the time they are sixty, the gap has expanded to more than $15,000
per year. This does not seem like a very big disparity until one remembers that he has earned
more every year, with his extra earnings totaling $361,171. Id.; see also Weinberger, supra note
17, at 972 (stating that the large gender gap in earnings seems to have very little to do with falling behind over the course of career and instead is confined to the early years of a woman’s
career).
93 BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 2, at 22-23.
94 Id. at 21.
95 Id. at 23.
96 See, e.g., Eichner, supra note 25, at 152 (stating that because society views autonomous
individuals as “unencumbered” the attachment and obligation of children must be considered
the product of free choice). Even when not stated as a negative, writers still emphasize “choice.”
See, e.g., Browne & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 3, at 82 (noting that women who are close to
shattering the glass ceiling have already raised children or choose to place more of an emphasis
on their jobs than on their families). Of course, I presume that stating that a woman is “choosing” to care more about her job than her family would be seen as a negative by many, putting
women in a “catch-22.”
97 WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 9. For instance, feminist Linda Hirshman blames the feminist
movement for placing so much of an emphasis on respecting women’s choices because she does
not believe that all choices are equal—she believes all women should work. LINDA R.
HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK: A MANIFESTO FOR WOMEN OF THE WORLD 9-10 (Viking 2006).
98 See, e.g., VALIAN, supra note 20, at 36; WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 31 (stating that mothers spend much more time than fathers on children’s enrichment activities and achievement-
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pects of the glass ceiling: 1) women are believed to avoid long-hour,
high-pressure jobs (or they might not get chosen because of their
caregiving responsibilities), and 2) their “choice” to spend time on
caregiving tasks often means that they will earn less in salary, raises,
99
and bonuses. As stated by Martha Chamallas:
The conventional wisdom is that because women place more importance on their families, they voluntarily choose to subordinate
their career and job aspirations for the sake of their children or
their partners. This rationale allows employers to make the paradoxical claim that women actually prefer lower-paying jobs or
100
jobs that offer little opportunity for advancement.
101

This “choice” rhetoric became very popular in the media after
102
Lisa Belkin’s New York Times article, “The Opt-Out Revolution.”
While some part of Belkin’s article dealt with opting out of the workplace entirely, she was also referring to women who choose very part103
time, contractual positions. While she recognizes that workplaces
might be at fault, she mainly “blames” (although does not appear to be
104
critical of) women’s decisions to leave the workforce completely.
She states: “It’s not just that the workplace has failed women. It is
105
also that women are rejecting the workplace.” Based on her study of
a small group of professional women, she argues that women do not
want to work that hard to achieve the highest level of success in the
106
Some
workplace, and that feminism “is the freedom to choose.”
107
have argued that the opt-out revolution is a myth, which was debunked by a 2009 report by the U.S. Census Bureau that revealed
related activities); see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Embracing Caregiving and Respecting
Choice: An Essay on the Debate over Changing Gender Norms, 41 SW. L. REV. 1, 36 (2011).
99 Women’s choice to not travel (especially travel abroad) also creates an informal barrier
to women’s success in the workplace. Browne & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 3, at 72.
100 CHAMALLAS, supra note 24, at 14.
101 See Selmi, supra note 22, at 574 (discussing the fact that the view that women are “opting
out” of the workforce “pervades the popular media”).
102 Belkin, supra note 8.
103 WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 21 (describing Lisa Belkin’s “opt-out” narrative as referring
to not only quitting work altogether, but stepping off the fast track by working part-time, becoming independent contractors or working full time on the “mommy track”).
104 Belkin, supra note 8 (emphasis added); see also Selmi, supra note 22, at 575 (stating that
the common narrative alleges that women are choosing to opt out rather than being forced out
for reasons of discrimination or some other factor that complicates the choice).
105 Belkin, supra note 8.
106 Id.
107 See WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 10 (stating that the opt-out stories represent a highly
misleading picture of what it means to opt out); id. at 23 (stating that the major drawback of the
opt-out story line is that it is not true); Weinberger, supra note 17, at 971 (noting that recent
media reports discuss highly educated women opting out of the labor force even though there is
no statistical evidence to support that opting out is a widespread phenomenon).
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most stay-at-home mothers were part of low-income families with
limited educations, rather than the high-status professional women
108
Nevertheless, this narrative of
Belkin highlighted in her article.
women either opting out or going on the “mommy track” has not lost
traction in the media.
Of course, this “choice” to opt out completely has also been criticized. In her aptly titled book, Get to Work: A Manifesto for Women of
the World, Linda Hirshman criticizes women for making the “meaningless” choice of opting out, and criticizes feminism for allowing
109
women to think that all choices are equally valuable. She states:
Bounding home is not good for women and it’s not good for society. They aren’t using their capacities fully; their so-called free
choice makes them unfree dependents on their husbands.
Whether they leave the workplace altogether or just cut back
their commitment, their talent and education are lost from the
public world to the private world of laundry and kissing booboos. The abandonment of the public world by women at the top
means the ruling class is overwhelmingly male. If the rulers are
male, they will make mistakes that benefit males. . . .[T]he alternative to a meaningless “choice” is value, the value of a flourishing life[, which] includes using your talents and capacities to the
110
fullest and reaping the rewards of doing so.
Another example (still controversial albeit not nearly as radical)
is Sheryl Sandberg in her best-selling book, Lean In: Women, Work,
111
and the Will to Lead. Sandberg argues that we need more women in
112
Although she recognizes that there are societal
leadership roles.
barriers to women getting ahead in the workplace, she also thinks that
women are hindered by internal barriers, such as the fact that women
“continue to do the majority of the housework and childcare” and
“compromise [their] career goals to make room for partners and chil-

108 Melissa J. Anderson, Free to Choose: Does Our Culture of Individualism Harm Working
Moms?, THE GLASS HAMMER (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.theglasshammer.com. Joan Williams
noted that the opt-out stories focused on professional women when only eight percent of U.S.
women hold these jobs and highly educated women are much more likely, not less, to remain in
the labor force. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 10.
109 HIRSHMAN, supra note 97, at 9-10.
110 Id. at 10.
111 SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (Alfred A.
Knopf 2013). I describe Sandberg as “not nearly as” radical because, unlike Hirshman, who
believes that all women should work, Sandberg is careful to recognize that not all women want
the same things, and that some women will want to be caregivers. Id. at 14.
112 Id. at 11. As she states: “A truly equal world would be one where women ran half our
countries and companies and men ran half our homes.” Id.
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113

dren who may not even exist yet.” And although she does discuss
the workplace and societal barriers, she believes focusing on women’s
internal barriers is productive because those barriers are in women’s
114
control to change. Sandberg recognizes that some will see her message as “blaming the victim,” but she believes that having more female
115
leaders is the key to women’s success in the workplace. The message
I took from her book is that even though she is careful to
acknowledge that not all women will want to be leaders, she believes
that too many women are making the choice to opt out or not pursue
116
ambitious, rewarding careers.
In addition to “opting out,” the other “choice” women are said to
make regarding work and caregiving is the choice to be the primary
caregiver of their children and therefore to not meet the ideal worker
117
norm.
The rationale of some commentators is that women who
choose to have children and choose not to be ideal workers are choosing to not be similarly situated to their non-caregiver counterparts
(whether male or female) and therefore deserve to be treated differ118
ently. Many scholars argue that the decision to have children, and
the decision about how to balance work and family, are unconstrained
choices for which only the parent is responsible — and the market or
119
state should have nothing to do with the parent’s choice.
In addition to scholars, courts too, often place value judgments on
women’s choices regarding caregiving. In one case, the court contrasted justifiable leaves of absence, such as those for an employee suffering an extended incapacity from illness or injury, to less justifiable
leaves for “young mothers wishing to nurse their babies for six
120
months.” Courts also emphasize that women could “choose” not to
parent or could “choose” to parent in a way that did not interfere with
121
work. As aptly summarized by one commentator: “When women are
113

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
115 Id. at 14.
116 Id. at 14, 17 (quoting Judith Rodin, president of the Rockefeller Foundation and the first
woman to serve as president of an Ivy League University as stating: “We believe in choices. But
choosing to leave the workforce was not the choice we thought so many of you would make.”).
117 Porter, Why Care?, supra note 17, at 382 (stating that many blame mothers for the choices they have made that contribute to their inequality in the workplace); see also Kaye, supra note
8, at 574-75 (stating that regardless of whether female attorneys will leave or stay after having
children, the “perceptions about mothering continue to be a big negative”).
118 Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and Responsibility, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 573, 574-75 (2007); Porter, Why Care?, supra note 17, at 383.
119 Eichner, supra note 25, at 150-51; Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational
Myth: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 14
(2000); Porter, Why Care?, supra note 17, at 384.
120 Eichner, supra note 25, at 146.
121 Id.
114
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forced to leave work to accommodate these domestic responsibilities,
they are deemed to have made a ‘choice’ and to have only themselves
to blame. The ideology of choice therefore privatizes and individualizes a system of subordination and then uses the notion of consent to
122
justify it.”
III. THE CONVERGENCE OF CHOICES: A STORY ABOUT “JULIE”
As stated in the Introduction, I am certainly not the first scholar
to discuss the rhetoric of choice. Many scholars have demonstrated in
their scholarship how the law and society are focused on and perhaps
123
even fascinated with the concept of choice. But, as stated earlier,
most of this literature has focused on one kind of “choice” — the
choice of occupation, the choice to negotiate, or the choices women
124
make in balancing work and family. This is (to my knowledge) the
first attempt to explore all three choices together. This Part will briefly describe how these three choices work together, and will then illustrate the convergence through the story of a fictional (but very realistic) woman, Julie. To reiterate my disclaimer in the introduction: I do
not believe these choices are freely made, unconstrained choices. I
believe they are influenced by gender norms, family dynamics, the
structure of workplaces, and discrimination in the workplace. But,
constrained or not, there are still choices, and this Part will discuss
how the convergence of these three choices creates the achievement
gap between men and women.
First, the most common use of the blame game is the allegation
that women choose to devote significantly more time and effort to
caregiving than men do. That choice inevitably influences other
choices. Women who are primary caregivers might choose an occupation where the hours are reasonable and there is flexibility in the
workplace. Furthermore, caregiving responsibilities might influence a
woman’s decisions about how hard to work, whether to apply for a
promotion, or whether to take on an extra assignment, all of which
might also affect her pay. The choice to be a primary caregiver might
also cause a woman to choose a part-time job, and in this country,
part-time work is synonymous with second-class citizenship, negative125
ly affecting pay, as well as opportunities for promotion.

122

Id. at 148.
Supra Part II.
124 Supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
125 Nicole Buonocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrated Approach to Solving the
Caregiver Conundrum for “Real” Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777 (2010).
123
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Second, as discussed above, employers and courts often argue
that women tend to be friendly, cooperative, and selfless, and that these traits might lead women to choose jobs that are more cooperative
than competitive, perhaps causing them to avoid the most high-status,
high-stress jobs, which typically require aggressive, competitive per126
sonality styles. These same traits might also cause women to choose
to not negotiate for their own salaries or benefits because they fear
127
that negotiating will harm their relationships with others.
To illustrate how these choices converge, I borrow one of the
128
moves from feminist legal theory: telling a story. Below is the story
of “Julie”:
Julie has a college degree in business from a very good state school.
She received very good grades in college and had an externship at a
Fortune 500 company. Immediately after college, she became pregnant
unintentionally with her long-term boyfriend, and they decided to get
married. She decided not to apply for jobs because she felt uncomfortable lying about her pregnancy and assumed no one would hire her
while pregnant. Once her baby was about six months old, she applied
for a few jobs, but because she lacked self-confidence, she aimed her
sights low and only applied for jobs where a college degree was a plus,
but not required. She also avoided jobs where travel was necessary because her husband was an attorney and worked crazy hours, and she
knew travel would be impossible with her baby.
One job she applied for, an inside sales position at an automotive
supplier, called her for an interview. During the interview, the woman
who was interviewing her (Susan, the manager of the inside sales department) noticed her impressive credentials and asked her if she was
129
interested in applying to the outside sales department. Susan told Julie
that the outside sales department is an aggressive and competitive group
of mostly men. They work long hours but the earning potential is much
higher, although Susan also told Julie that the base salary was quite a bit
lower than the inside sales position because the outside sales employees
made most of their income from commissions. Susan suggested that if
126

See generally supra Part II.A; see also BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 2, at 107,

116.
127 BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 2, at 108 (discussing how women caring more
about relationships than personal gain is a powerful gender norm).
128 CHAMALLAS, supra note 24, at 4-6 (discussing how one of the “opening moves” of feminist legal theorists is to talk about “women’s experiences”).
129 The inside sales department spends most of its time in the office, managing the accounts
of current customers. While the job is mostly one of relationship management, there are occasionally opportunities to make additional sales. In contrast, the outside sales department is on
the road, soliciting new business. The ability to negotiate and close the sale is very important for
this position.
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Julie was interested, Susan could see if Michael, the manager of the outside sales department, was available for her to talk to. Julie said no
thank you; she was happy applying for the inside sales position.
Julie was given the job, and in her first couple of years, established
herself as efficient, great with customer relationships, and overall a great
employee. Each year she received the standard three percent raise in
salary. She had heard of some employees requesting more than three
percent and receiving it if they were extraordinary employees, but Julie
did not think she could put herself in that category and never asked for
more. In Julie’s third year with the company, Susan, the inside sales
manager, announced that she was leaving the company for another opportunity. Susan suggested to Julie that she should apply for the manager position. Julie asked about the position and found out from Susan
that the inside sales manager worked about fifty hours per week, handling a full load of customers plus all of the administrative and managerial functions. The inside sales manager also occasionally traveled to
customers’ businesses. Some of these trips were just long day trips (2-3
hours drive each way) but some were overnight trips. Of course, Susan
also mentioned that the salary for the sales manager position was significantly higher than what Julie was making at the time. Julie was fairly
bored with her current job and knew she would like the challenge and
higher income of the sales manager job, so she talked to her husband
about it. She told him about the job and how excited she was to apply
for it. He replied that he thought she would be great at it, but he did not
know how she was going to handle the care of their young daughter if
she was working those kinds of hours and traveling. He did not explicitly say that he would not help with drop-off or pick-up from daycare or
with the occasional sick days or doctor’s appointments, but he never had
helped before, so she did not even bother to ask him. Instead, she just
did not apply for the promotion.
Shortly after, Julie learned she was pregnant with her second child.
When her baby boy arrived, she took six weeks off (as allowed by the
company’s short-term disability policy) and then returned to work. She
found working full-time with two children significantly harder than
with one. The baby was sick more often than their older child, and Julie
constantly had to take time off for doctor’s appointments, or to go pick
up a sick child from daycare. Even though she was still doing a great
job fulfilling all of her responsibilities (because she was very efficient),
she often felt guilty about missing so much time, which was made worse
by some snide comments made by her new sales manager, a man named
John. Julie finally decided to consider a nanny, so she talked to her
husband about it. They crunched the numbers based on her salary (minus taxes, etc.) and the going rate for nannies in their area, and realized
she would only clear about $10,000 per year. Her husband asked her: if
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she were only able to contribute that small amount to the family income, wouldn’t she be better off not working? He had recently been
promoted to partner and they could live off his income alone. So even
though Julie loved working and thought she might be bored being
home full-time, she quit because she did not see any other way of handling her job with two young children and very little help from her husband.
This story is a compelling example of how the three choices work
together to contribute to Julie’s inability to reach her full potential,
and her eventual decision to opt-out of the workplace entirely. First,
because of her low self-confidence and because of her caregiving responsibilities for her baby, she set her sights low and did not apply for
the outside sales job that would have been more prestigious and
would have allowed her to earn much more money. Second, her lack
of self-confidence also caused her to be uncomfortable asking for
more than the standard raises, even though she likely deserved more
than the standard raise. Third, her caregiving responsibilities caused
her to turn down the opportunity for a promotion. And finally, her
decision to opt-out completely can be largely described as a choice
about caregiving, but other factors also contributed to it. If Julie had
originally applied for the outside sales position or if she had applied
for the inside sales manager position, she would likely have been making enough money that the nanny would have been more affordable; if
she had asked for more than the minimum raises, she might have been
making enough money to make the nanny worthwhile. Thus, Julie’s
story, which is a common one, demonstrates how the three “choices”
operate in tandem to contribute to the achievement gap between men
and women in the workplace. While there are certainly other explanations for Julie’s behavior (a theme I will be exploring in later work),
most outsiders would hear Julie’s story and believe she had made several voluntary choices regarding the course of her career.
In sum, these three choices — the choice of occupation, the
choice to not negotiate, and the choice regarding work/life balance —
converge to affect women’s achievement in the workplace. Women’s
relative lack of progress in the workplace hierarchies is influenced by
their decisions regarding their role as caregivers as well as their alleged lack of interest in men’s work. Women’s pay is also influenced
by all three choices. Thus, the blame game tells a fairly compelling
story of how women’s achievement gap in the workplace is caused by
their own choices.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHEN A CHOICE IS NOT REALLY A CHOICE
Despite the fact that there are many laws that provide women
formal equality in the workplace, there is still a significant achieve-
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ment gap between men and women in the workplace. This article described the “blame game” — the allegation that women are making
choices that affect their ability to succeed in the workplace. This
common narrative blames women’s lack of success on their choice of
occupation, their choice to not negotiate on their own behalf, and their
choice to devote considerable time to caregiving and their families.
But blaming women’s own choices is only one potential explanation
for the achievement gap in the workplace. The primary, competing
130
explanation is that what look like voluntary choices are not. Instead,
women’s choices are constrained by gender norms and society’s expectations, as well as by structural discrimination in the workplace.
Perhaps once this “autonomy myth” is exposed, we can start working
towards solutions that avoid the blame game.

130 WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 51 (“As a culture we need to stop lying to ourselves, stop
pretending that the ‘choices’ thrust on us by outmoded norms are actually choices made of free
will. We need to stop ignoring the fact that the available choices are dismally inadequate.”).

